Born in Bristow, Oklahoma, in 1926 to Christian Lebanese parents, Clovis Maksoud (كلوفيس مقصود) moved with his family to Beirut as a teenager. Maksoud was educated at the elite International School of Choueifat and the American University of Beirut before he returned to the United States to study law at George Washington University. He later went on to complete post-graduate studies at Oxford University. During his time in England, Maksoud developed an interest in India and a reputation as a capable debater. He was appointed as the Arab League Ambassador to India in 1961 at age 29 and served as League Ambassador to both the United States and the United Nations from 1979-1990. In addition to his diplomatic work, Maksoud was also a prolific author, journalist, and editor. Known for his passionate dedication to Arab nationalism, Maksoud was a staunch advocate for Palestinian independence. Upon Maksoud’s death, former Lebanese Ambassador to the United States Masoud Maalouf remarked that “Maksoud was one of the last warriors who truly believed in Arab nationalism and believed in the fight to defend Palestine as the cause for all Arabs.”[note]“Arab-American scholar Clovis Maksoud Dies aged 90,” Al Jazeera, May 16, 2016, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/05/arab-american-scholar-clovis-maksoud-dies-aged-90-160515210141960.html.[/note]
In promoting Arab nationalism, Maksoud believed in the political unity of Arabic-speaking people: “People who spoke a unitary language... have one heart and a common soul... constitute one nation” and strive for a unifying “state.”[note]Abu Khaldun Sati’ al-Husri, Ma Hiya al-Qawmiya? Abhath wa Dirasat ‘ala Dhaw’I al Ahdath wa al’Nadhariyat/What is Nationalism?: Enquiries and Studies in Light of Events and Theories (Beirut: Dar al-‘Ilm li al-Malayeen, 1963), 57. Albert Hourani, for instance, sees examples of Arab nationalism in the life and work of fourteenth-century philosopher Ibn Khaldun; Albert Hourani, A History of the Arab Peoples (New York: Warner Brooks, 1991), 4.[/note] While some scholars find traces of this thinking as far back as the medieval era, contemporary Arab nationalism developed as a political ideology in the early twentieth century.[note]Arab nationalism as a political ideology was popularized in the West by the figure of T.E. Lawrence following the Great Arab Revolt of World War I.[/note] During World War I, aspirations for an independent, united Arab nation-state helped fuel the Great Arab Revolt against Ottoman rule.[note]Salim Yaqub, Containing Arab Nationalism: The Eisenhower Doctrine and the Middle East (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2004), 31-32.[/note] Although the imperialist ambitions of Britain and France prevented the full realization of this vision during the interwar period, Arab nationalism emerged as a vibrant force with a revolutionary edge following the Egyptian Free Officers’ Coup in 1951. Promulgated by Egyptian Premier Gamal Abdul Nasser, Arab nationalism came to rest on four principles: (1) a belief that the Arabs were a common people sharing a common destiny, (2) a secular commitment to anti-colonialism and anti-Zionism, (3) a commitment to social and economic justice, and (4) a diplomatic nonalignment in the Cold War.[note]Salim Yaqub, Containing Arab Nationalism: The Eisenhower Doctrine and the Middle East (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2004), 31-32.[/note] Well-suited for the era of European decolonization, Arab nationalism made major strides until Nasser’s defeat in the 1967 Arab-Israeli War (also called the Six Day War). Despite this setback, advocates for Arab nationalism, like Maksoud, continued to make the case that pan-Arab unity offered the best path for an equitable Middle East order.
Starting in 1975, the Lebanese Civil War also presented a major challenge to Arab nationalism. As a multi-sided conflict lasting 15 years, the war pitted numerous militias and other sub-state actors against one another and the state. The war directly challenged the tenets of Arab nationalism as combatants organized along religious, ethnic, or regional lines, privileging confessional or other identities over pan-Arab attachments. Syrian dictator Hafez al-Asad cited the division caused by the war as a reason for intervention. Claiming to promote "the Arab cause and the Arab nation" and end a conflict that "undermin[ed] the principles of Arab nationalism," he sent troops to Lebanon following the Tel al-Zataar massacre of Palestinian refugees by a force of Lebanese Christian militias.[note] Adeed Dawisha, Arab Nationalism in the Twentieth Century: From Triumph to Despair (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003), 271; See also A.J. Abraham, The Lebanon War (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1996), 69-85.[/note] Far from rallying regional sentiment for Arab nationalism, however, Syrian intervention was decried by governments across the Middle East, exposing Arab disunity.
Maksoud delivered a speech on October 2, 1976 at the 9th Annual Convention of Arab-American University Graduates (AAUG). The convention was held at the Biltmore Hotel in New York City. Maksoud’s speech directly addressed the challenge that the Lebanese Civil War posed to pan-Arab unity. Stylistically, Maksoud was known for his extensive vocabulary and for using extremely long sentences to argue his points, seemingly adopting elements of a more free-flowing Arabic syntax in his speeches.[note]James G. Abourezk, “Clovisizing America,” Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, March 2009, https://www.wrmea.org/2009-march/clovisizing-america.html.[/note] Both these elements of Maksoud’s rhetoric, as well as his fervent commitment to Arab nationalism, can be seen in his speech before the AAUG Convention.
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After Theodore Roosevelt left the presidency in 1909, he embarked on a 15-month tour of Africa and Europe—a journey that captured the interest and imagination of people at home and abroad. Roosevelt’s adventures were chronicled in the 1910 volume, African Game Trails, where he detailed his enchantment with big game hunting and the geographical, botanical, and zoological landscape of Africa.[note]Theodore Roosevelt, African Game Trails: An Account of the African Wanderings of an American Hunter-Naturalist (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1919), vii–x.[/note] Leisurely pursuits aside, Roosevelt also sought to create both physical and political distance between himself and his successor, William Howard Taft.[note]J. Lee Thompson, Theodore Roosevelt Abroad: Nature, Empire, and the Journey of an American President (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), x.[/note] As an ex-president, Roosevelt’s tour did not entail a formal diplomatic role. Yet, he did engage in unofficial American diplomacy. Most importantly, Roosevelt intended to strengthen American imperialism in the Philippines by comparing United States relations with the Philippines to its British counterparts in Africa.[note]Roosevelt made the argument, for example, in this way: “It is of interest to all civilized men that a similar success shall attend alike the Englishman and the German as they work in East Africa; exactly as it has been a benefit to everyone that America took possession of the Philippines;” Theodore Roosevelt and Lawrence F. Abbott, “British Rule in Africa: Address Delivered at the Guildhall, London, May 31, 1910,” in African and European Addresses (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1910), 205.[/note]
Egypt, the last leg of Roosevelt's tour through Africa, was fraught with political uncertainty. Though technically ruled by a Khedive, an Egyptian leader that was part of the Ottoman Empire, Egypt was, practically speaking, a British protectorate. Egypt, like other colonial protectorates at the time, was subjected to the evolving shifts in modern nationalism. Nationalist movements across the country demanded “Egypt for Egyptians” and “Egypt for Moslems” in the form of self-government.[note]John Callan O’Laughlin, “Roosevelt to Have Keen Guard in Cairo,” New York Times, March 23, 1910, 4.[/note] Prime Minister Boutros Ghali Pasha, a Coptic Christian and a strong supporter of British oversight in Egypt, attracted the ire of the Nationalist Party because of his support for extending the French lease on the Suez Canal and for wrongly sentencing five Egyptians to death for the alleged murder of a British officer.[note]John Callan O’Laughlin, 4.[/note] On February 10, 1910, just a few weeks before Roosevelt’s visit, a member of the Egyptian Nationalist Party assassinated the Boutros Ghali Pasha.[note]David H. Burton, Theodore Roosevelt: Confident Imperialist (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1969), 179.[/note] A political assassination of this kind was unprecedented in Egypt and the British had yet to try the perpetrator in court by the time Roosevelt arrived.[note]John Callan O’Laughlin, “Roosevelt to Have Keen Guard in Cairo,”4.[/note] Lord Eldon Gorst, then Counsel-General of Egypt, feared complicating an already volatile situation and discouraged Roosevelt from commenting on the assassination in his public remarks.[note]Stephen Wertheim, “Reluctant Liberator: Theodore Roosevelt’s Philosophy of Self-Government and Preparation for Philippine Independence,” Presidential Studies Quarterly 39, no. 3 (2009): 503.[/note] Roosevelt, in an attitude of confident “indifference,” condemned the assassination and those who supported it in no uncertain terms in his “Law and Order in Egypt” speech.[note]John Callan O’Laughlin, “Roosevelt to Have Keen Guard in Cairo,”4.[/note]
The “Law and Order in Egypt” speech was delivered at the National University in Cairo (now known as the University of Cairo) to commemorate its establishment as an institution of higher learning. One of the most notable members of Roosevelt’s audience was Prince Ahmed Fouad, the uncle of the Khedive. The audience also included British dignitaries and a largely nationalist student body.[note]John Callan O’Laughlin, “Roosevelt Censures Killing of Boutros,” New York Times, March 29, 1910, 4.[/note] In his speech, Roosevelt extolled the virtues of education in the advancement of a civilization while strongly encouraging Egyptians to be patient in their pursuit of self-governance. Egyptians, according to Roosevelt, needed to cultivate their moral character under the auspices of the civilizing power—an attitude he inherited from his father who was a religious reformer in New York City. [note]Burton, Theodore Roosevelt: Confident Imperialist, 9–10.[/note]
Reception to Roosevelt’s message was mixed. Conservative commentators in London like The Spectator, called Roosevelt’s speech “so wise and so honorable.”[note]“Roosevelt and Egypt: Liberal Organs in England Blame and Conservatives Praise Cairo Speech,” New York Times, April 2, 1910, 6.[/note] Liberal British observers found Roosevelt’s call for more exacting rule in Egypt a haphazard interference in British affairs.[note]“Liberal Organs in England Blame and Conservatives Praise Cairo Speech,” 6.[/note] Egyptian responses were not quite so diverse. Though some Egyptian conservative and Christian newspapers were delighted with Roosevelt’s recommendations, the streets of Cairo erupted with protests following the “Law and Order in Egypt” speech.[note]John Callan O’Laughlin, “Egyptians Resent Roosevelt Speech,” New York Times, March 30, 1910, 4.[/note] The Young Egypt Committee called the speech “offensive to the whole nation” and accused Roosevelt of fashioning it only to appease his hosts—the British colonial governors.[note]“Condemns Roosevelt Speech,” New York Times, April 1, 1910, 4.[/note] Despite his controversial speech, Roosevelt was still awarded the highest honorary degree from the university.[note]John Callan O’Laughlin, “Roosevelt Censures Killing of Boutros,”4.[/note]
The “Law and Order in Egypt” speech, when read in tandem with his speeches “Peace and Order in the Sudan” (Khartoum, March 16, 1910) and “British Rule in Africa” (London, May 31, 1910), illustrates Roosevelt’s complicated philosophy on self-government and imperialism.[note]Wertheim, “Reluctant Liberator: Theodore Roosevelt’s Philosophy of Self-Government and Preparation for Philippine Independence,” 495–96.[/note]
Read more.Shawn J. Parry-Giles, Ph.D.
University of Maryland
Department of Communication
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301-405-6527 | spg@umd.edu
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